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Class, Race and American Labor
Some Consideration on Nelson Lichtenstein’s State of the Union
Catherine Collomp
1 Labor history in the United States is well‑chartered territory. It is the object of countless
scholarly books, appears in many college and university curricula and it is the subject of
on‑going revisions and debates. Although labor history has always implied a form of at
least  implicit  social  commitment,  it  has been commented upon and written about as
abundantly as other aspects of social history and often with more stamina or vindication.
Nineteenth  and  early  twentieth‑century  working  class  formation,  unionization,  and
institutional labor organizations, as well as labor politics, strikes and militancy have been
studied, commented upon and been the object of sharp discussions.
2 Yet, as we are now in the 21st century, it appears that our knowledge of the second half of
the 20th century is not established on such firm ground as is the case for earlier periods.
Such  concepts  as  class,  working  class,  workers,  unions,  have  disappeared  from  the
current  vocabulary  or  acquired  new  meanings.  This  is  not  simply  the  effect  of
post‑modernism, but a sign of what Nelson Lichtenstein calls the “eclipse of the labor
question.”
3 Familiar explanations of current events on the labor scene fade into insignificance, shift
into other categories as de‑industrialization has completely changed the structure of the
work force and consequently the role and scope of labor unions.
4 In addition, the decline of the organized labor movement itself contributes to discrediting
scholarly interest in labor history as a field of inquiry. In a short span of time, towards
the end of the 1980’s, labor historians were struck by the disquieting feeling that there is
less at stake politically, and also less scholarly interest in studying labor history than
there was in the three previous decades. Was it a “ripple effect” of the collapse of the left
in all Western societies and of the absence of credible alternatives to the capitalist order
or to capitalist societies as they exist today? History is surely about things past, but as
many historians have argued, this past is only interesting inasmuch as it is relevant to the
present, or can be revisited with contemporary sensitivities. In State of the Union, Nelson
Lichtenstein does much to bring the question to the fore in its many crucial aspects. His
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belief that labor has a “unique and transcendent function [...] designed to micromanage
the labor market, both inside the workplace and out” (18) stimulates our questions and
revives our hopes that the labor question is not out of place in the modern world.
5 Starting from the firm ground which Nelson Lichtenstein himself contributed to establish
of New Deal and World War II labor history, State of the Union provides a new synthesis on
the evolution of the American labor movement since World War II (in spite of its subtitle
A Century of American Labor, the book is more about the second half of the century than
the first). 
6 It spans over 5 decades of US labor, political and intellectual history. The scope is wide
and the purpose at least twofold. Lichtenstein explains the causes of labor’s institutional
demise and, more importantly, he emphasizes that, for the sake of the workers, and for
American social progress as a whole, unionization is just as necessary as it was at the
beginning of the century. This book is therefore predicated, as the author underlines, on
the idea that “a larger, more powerful, and more democratic trade‑union movement is
essential to any progressive reso lution of the contemporary stalemate that structures
social politics in the United States” (17). Lichtenstein does not accept the widespread
notion that  unionization is  no longer  in  the  order  of  the  day:  wages  have declined,
arbitrariness  reigns supreme,  work shifts  are long,  part  time is  imposed not  chosen,
absence of job security prevails in many sectors and especially in the most dynamic ones
where jobs are created. The point is made at the outset of the book: “90% of all private
sector workers in the United States are employed under at‑will doctrines. [....] The rights
of workers as workers,  and especially as workers acting in an autonomous, collective
fashion,  have  moved  into  the  shadows.  The  law,  the  managerial  ethos,  the
opinion‑forming  pundits,  indeed  many  workers  themselves,  have  marginalized  and
ridiculed the idea that democratic norms should govern the workplace” (3). 
7 Many explanations have been given for the decline of unionization and unionism. These
reasons  generally  belong to  three  sets  of  arguments.  They first  have  sprung from a
criticism of the labor movement itself, making it responsible for its inadequacy to the
present situation. Much New Left criticism on the failing AFL‑CIO leadership in the 1960’s,
George Meany and his  conservative views,  has been expressed for long.  Paul  Buhle’s
recent book, Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers, George Meany, Lane Kirkland and the
Tragedy of American Labor (New York, 1999) indicates that from its inception the US labor
movement has been plagued by conservative leaders. But that in itself brings us back to
the classic question: why is that so? And why have not more radical and open movements
of the type of the Knights of Labor, the IWW or the early CIO taken a steadfast hold in the
American context? 
8 The  second  set  of  explanations  refers  to  the  economic  environment:  the  changing
structure  of  the  economy  from  the  1960’s  to  the  present.  De‑industrialization,
international competition, the rise of a service economy where more than four‑fifths of
the work force is employed now, the disappearance of the large factories and of a skilled
and semi‑skilled labor force of operatives which was the basis of union strength, are parts
of the explanation.
9 Yet the inability of labor organizations to appeal to white collar workers, and to organize
sales and service workers (banks, insurance companies, hotels, restaurants, medical care)
is partly a direct consequence of the first problem: the AFL‑CIO’s absence of vision,
imagination and radicalism and its snug bureaucracy since the 1950’s and 60’s. It has now
become practically impossible to organize new locals,  let alone new unions.  Workers,
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often employed on a part time basis, and in small units, are rarely likely to risk their jobs
for the benefits of a union after years of litigation. Not to mention the legal constraints of
the Wagner Act ill‑adapted to today’s workforce.
10 Another  cause  of  labor’s  decline  is  ascribed  to  the  political  culture  and  managerial
prerogatives of American employers: US managers’ aggressive tactics to get rid of the
unions, or avoid them when none exist, have become highly sophisticated to circumvent
labor  laws.  As  Lichtenstein  puts  it:  “The  most  exceptional  character  of  US  labor/
management relations is the hostility managers have shown toward the regulatory state
and virtually all  systems of worker representation” (105).  And of course the workers’
reluctance to unionize is understandable when the risk incurred for them is that of losing
their jobs. American employers’ visceral opposition to unionization is not new. It was
even fiercer, less subtle, a hundred years ago, and legally so. What now appears is that the
New Deal  parenthesis  (1935‑75),  which also partly corresponded to the 30 years of  a
glorious economy, had caused us to forget the employers’ historic opposition to labor
rights, or had created the illusion that it could be overcome.
11 Nelson Lichtenstein explores these related factors, not successively, but together, seeking
to establish the genealogy of the present legal situation through the many stages when
laws were enacted, jurisprudence created or modified. The thread through these chapters
is legal history. In this respect NL’s book has much to do with a line of the school of new
labor legal  history that  includes David Montgomery’s Citizen  Worker,  The  Experience  of
Workers  in the United States  with Democracy and the  Free Market  during the XIX th Century
(Cambridge,  1993)  and  other  studies  more  directly  related  to  studying  state/labor
relations such as Christopher Tomlins (The State and the Unions,  New York,  1985) and
Melvyn Dubofsky (The State and Labor in Modern America, Chapel Hill, 1994).
12 To state the case clearly,  and dramatically,  Nelson Lichtenstein offers a fourth set of
explanations. He establishes the contradistinction between the workers’ collective rights
and the ascendancy of individual rights through the litigation of discrimination cases
since the 1960’s and the Affirmative Action programs. Thus race enters the picture, not so
much by reference to the divisive power of racism in the unions or the workplace, but
because the nation at  large,  and employers in particular,  are now responding to the
demand for racial equality while they are opposed to union recognition and a union’s
right to establish democracy in the work place. 
13 Race and class have always had an antagonistic relation in US social history. That vicious
relation has recently been re‑emphasized by the crop of “whiteness studies” that have
appeared in the last ten years (in the wake of David Roediger’s Wages of Whiteness, London,
1991)  pointing  to  the  construction  of  racial  identity  among  white  workers  and  the
benefits derived from that consciousness. Lichtenstein’s perspective, of course, does not
ignore  that,  but  he  looks  at  it  from  the  view  point  of  the  new  forms  of  rights
consciousness  as  they  have  developed  since  the  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1964  and  its
implementation in the workplace and in all aspects of the public sphere. He maintains
that individual workers’ rights may easily be vindicated, but not the collective rights of
workers—even, and perhaps especially, when they offer a united multiracial front. The
employers’ legal and economic powers can defeat unionization by way of the old trick of
satisfying individual demands of equal treatment thus downgrading the economic status
of the workers as a collective group and depriving them of empowerment. Lichtenstein
brilliantly explains that Affirmative Action has become the most publicized social agenda
in  the  workplace,  public  or  private.  Employers’  commitment  to  “Equal  Employment
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Opportunity” for all workers regardless of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age,
or marital status is the rule of the land in labor management. At the same time, insecurity
in the workplace has also become the rule of the land and the basis of the new economy.
14 Indeed US law and society now recognize ethnicity, race, and gender ascription in an
unprecedented and favorable manner, thus leading to identity politics and claims that
preempt  or  precede  other  forms  of  collective  action.  But  one  problem  with  that
interpretation  is  that  of  causality.  Is  it  because  of  the  favorable  response  that
anti‑discrimination suits have obtained in the courts that the union movement does not
keep its hold? Surely not. And the exception given in State of the Union (181‑186) of the
high degree of unionization among black workers in the public services is proof to the
contrary. When unions are not attacked they may flourish, especially if they also fight for
racial equality. And figures prove that African‑Americans are more likely to be union
members than white workers (respectively 25.4%, 17.7% according to the 1989 Statistical.
Abstract of the US, for instance). The simple factor of their more massive presence in the
working class or lower middle class explains the imbalance.
15 The articulation between race (or ethnicity and gender)  has immense and complexly
related  variables.  It  deals  with  human  agency,  labor  politics,  culture  and  indeed
employers, but also with the state, justice, the law and the courts. The problem is the
relation between these elements. I would perhaps historicize the interplay between race
and class, as aspects of social experience, differently from Lichtenstein’s interpretation
which emphasizes the 1960’s as the moment when individual (anti‑discrimination) rights
started overcoming collective rights.
16 The nexus of relations between race, class and empowerment has a long history which,
until  the  advent  of  the  CIO,  was  predominantly  one  of  exclusion  for  women  and
non‑white workers and therefore a cause for fragility in the labor movement. The Wagner
Act, the CIO, and the full employment generated by World War II, reversed that situation.
Possibilities for the existence of a powerful labor and inter‑racial movement was already
at stake in the 1940’s, at the apex of labor’s power. But it was immediately attacked by the
employers’ indomitable resistance which led to the 1947 Taft‑Hartley Act and to later acts
to  curb  labor  (Landrum Griffin).  It  is  therefore  no  coïncidence  that  the  Civil  rights
legislation was belatedly enacted in 1964, that is after labor had been dealt the most
severe  blows.  Not only  blows  to  its  regular  functioning  in  the  work  place  (strike
regultation, right to work clauses, employers’ right to campaign against unionization,
stipulated in the Taft Hartley Act). But also, in the context of the Cold War, the most
definitive  attacks  were  dealt  against  labor’s  radical  left,  the  Communist  Party
particularly.  Only  after  the  labor  movement  had  been  deprived  of  its  most  radical
contenders and able organizers, did the state, through the US Supreme court’s judicial
activism, began to dismantle segregation. Desegregation was a major achievement, but it
operated within the tamed polity of the Cold war era. It is only then that the Warren
Court  formulated  the  Brown  v.  Topeka  Board  of  Education decision  (1954),  later  to  be
followed by the 1964 Act to more fully eradicate segregation. This was a time when the
labor movement seemed economically strong and reunited within the AFL‑CIO, but whose
political clout, beyond support to the Democratic party, had been eliminated and had led
to a “pluralist society,” that is one where unions are tolerated as long as the economy can
support their claims. 
17 Thus if I agree with Lichtenstein that an immense shift in power relations took place in
the 1960’s and 70’s, I think the roots of labor’s decline had already been at play since the
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late 1940’s. And the ascendancy of individual rights can be seen as a consequence of the
stagnation and decline of labor unionism. In the 1960’s, simultaneously the old industrial
order  began  to  crumble  (inflation,  automation,  de‑industrialization,  international
competition), and individual rights, the corner stone of American constitutionalism, were
given a new recognition by elimination of  all  discriminatory factors that  maintained
racial minorities in a form of second class citizenship. The question as to why the labor
movement was not able to join forces with the Civil Rights movement to create a broad
social and political coalition for social justice lay in these historical precedents. Labor had
already become too conservative and too much on the defensive to seize the objective
benefit of an alliance with the progressive forces of the Civil Rights movement. These, in
addition, were most active and successful in the South where labor was constitutionally
weak. And, in the North and West, the failure of the economy to match economic equality
with civic equality soon became manifest with the ghetto riots.
18 Several  chronologies  that  reinforce  the  contemporary  shift  in  power  relations  are
intertwined here. The US Supreme Court’s intervention in the realm of individual rights
is  relatively recent in American constitutional  history.  It  is  certainly very new when
compared to the right of contracts by which employers have always been free to hire or
fire at will. It is only in the 20th century (Gitlow v. New York, 1925) when the SC started to
take up the defense of individual rights and only after the 1937 crisis in the court, and the
decline  of  MacCarthysim,  that  the  court  was  now  able  to  address  the  problem
significantly.  If  historian  Eric  Foner  has  called  the  Reconstruction  an  “unfinished
revolution,”  (Reconstruction,  America’s  Unfinished  Revolution,  New  York,  1988)  we  may
suggest  that  as  long  as  individual  rights  were  not  fully  equally  established  the
constitutionality of these rights also remained unfinished, that may be what is still at play
now.
19 The question of the primacy of labor’s ability to subsume racial antagonism seems to be
taken for granted in Lichtenstein’s work. And indeed in theory it should be. But most
historians of the African‑American experience point out to persisting inequalities and
hostility. Bruce Nelson’s study of steelworkers in the post World War II era (Divided We
Stand: American Workers and the Struggle for Black Equality, Princeton, 2001) has shown the
inability of the Steel Workers’ Union (USWA) to establish equal seniority rights between
white  and black  workers  well  into  the  1960’s  and 70’s,  that  is  when work began to
disappear  and  the  union  to  decline.  Even  through  these  decades  the  rate  of
unemployment was twice as high among black workers as among whites. Thomas Sugrue
(The Origins of the Urban Crisis, Race and Inequality in Post War Detroit, Princeton, 1996) has
similar examples for Detroit and the formation of a jobless ghettoized proletariat. And
the work of William Julius Wilson (The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass
and Public Policy, Chicago,1987; When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor, New
York, 1996) has confirmed the persistence of this phenomenon. Race Matters, as Cornel
West has suggested (Boston, 1993), and by race, he means the social construction of race
on  the  two  sides  of  inter‑racial  relations.  The  subject  of  race  as  a  shared  culture,
grounded in religion, a common past and experience, which leads to strongly articulated
community reactions and today’s assertion of equal rights,  is  not really addressed in
these pages. 
20 To my knowledge (limited to the study of the late 19th and early 20th centuries), unionism
never was a primary form of organization in the American working class. It only came
into existence when it  coalesced with other forms of social  organization.  These were
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primarily local and ethnic in the context of high immigration rates (and that is still the
case today), but also political or religious. The resources for welfare were rooted in ethnic
or  religious  associations  and  fraternal  orders.  For  instance,  the  highest  degree  of
organization at the turn of the century was among Jewish workers in the garment trades,
it sprang from a common linguistic, cultural, political (socialist) and religious heritage
which became a model for the most modern forms of unionization achieved in the 1930’s.
Unionization also took hold when its structural mode of organization adequately matched
the most dynamic forms of industrial production. Trade‑unionism among craftsmen in
the building trades, for instance, resulted from the fact that they were employed in small
units relying on highly skilled workers who thus had leverage on their employers. The
success of the CIO, to take another example, lay in its adequacy with the environment of
mass production in large factories. But what are the economic structures of production
today when de‑localization and de‑industrialization have transformed the economy? And
when the possibilities of  unionization for clerical  and service workers are practically
inhibited by the law with the exception of the public sector? 
21 The situation today may be compared to that of the early 20th century, with the important
exception that the local and federal state, as well as large companies, have become the
providers  of  welfare  systems,  however  fragmentary  and  incomplete  these  may  be.
Anti‑union  employers  have  seen  their  advantage  in  providing  insurance  benefits  in
exchange for unionization thus at the same time defeating any universal welfare system
which would have created a real counterweight to precariousness. The crucial debate
today is that of universality of welfare or of more uniform wage and pay scales. Can any
comparison be  drawn with  the  French situation?  France  has  an  even lower  level  of
unionization  than  the  United  States.  Yet  its  collective  bargaining  system,  also  more
fragile in today’s context, is not limited to actually unionized workers but is extended to
all workers in the same sector. The case here is one of centralization and much greater
state intervention than the United States would accept, an entirely foreign concept to the
American  political  culture  and  all  the  more  unlikely  to  develop  in  the  context  of
economic liberalism in the US today. 
22 By way of  conclusion one may wonder if  the heightened awareness of  rights,  whose
effects are so thoroughly and convincingly analyzed in these pages, is only a phase of
social  relations,  which when completed,  as David Hollinger has hoped it  will  be (Post
Ethnic  America: Beyond  Multiculturalism,  New  York,  1995),  would  lead  to  a  more  fully
egalitarian and universal citizenry,  and therefore to a more stable ground base for a
workers’ movement? The present situation in the United States and the globalization of
national economies in modern capitalism do not lead to unmitigated optimism for the
reconstruction of a broad union movement.
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